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Abstract—To prevent attacks on essential software and to
mitigate damage, an attack avoiding method that complicates
process identification from attackers is proposed. This method
complicates the identification of essential services by replacing
process information with dummy information. However, this
method allows attackers to identify essential processes by
detecting changes in process information. To address this prob-
lems and provide more complexity to process identification, this
paper proposes a memory access monitoring by using a virtual
machine monitor. By manipulating the page access permission,
a virtual machine monitor detects page access, which includes
process information, and replaces it with dummy information.
This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation
of the proposed method.
Keywords-attack avoidance; process information; virtualiza-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevention of attacks to computers is an important
research topic, for which protective software is developed.
In addition to security software, logging and analyzing
techniques are developed. We call these as essential services
or software, which are necessary to computers in the current
malware-spread situation; hence, the essential software be-
comes a target of attack from malware. Some malware have
a function to terminate or deactivate essential software [1],
[2], [3]. Min et al. proposed novel malware to subvert
the self-protection function of antiviruses [4], whereas the
current malware has advanced functionalities to terminate
or disable antivirus software. If an attacker terminates or
disables essential services, the computer is possibly taken
control over by malware, or damage may increase. Thus, it
is necessary to prevent attacks on essential services.
Some methods to prevent attacks to essential services
were proposed in [5], [6], [7], [8] and [9]. Hsu et al.
proposed antivirus software protection based on a kernel
mode driver [5]. However, kernel mode countermeasures are
vulnerable to kernel-level attacks. To address this problem,
virtual machine monitor (VMM) based security mechanisms
were proposed in [6], [7], [8], [9]. As a VMM is isolated
from guest operating systems (OS), attacking a VMM is
more difficult than attacking an OS. These approaches utilize
the property of a VMM and prove that the VMM-based
security mechanism have enough adequate security than an
OS-based security mechanism. Virtualization technology is
not limited to the abovementioned methods but is used for
security monitoring [10], [11] because of its isolation prop-
erty. However, the use of the existing approaches requires
modification to essential services. From these observations,
we determined that the security of essential services with
no modifications to that software is an important challenge.
However, the existing approaches do not satisfy these re-
quirements.
To address this problem, we proposed a process-hiding
method [12], which replaces process information of essential
services with dummy information to avoid identification of
the essential services. To protect the replacement mechanism
from kernel-level attacks, a VMM replaces process infor-
mation of each VM. However, the use of this replacement
method may possibly allow attackers to identify essential
services by continuously monitoring all process information.
As the replacement method replaces process information of
an essential service during context switching, an attacker
can detect the essential process if he/she detects a change
in process information at that time.
To address these problems, this paper proposes the mem-
ory access monitoring and disguising of process informa-
tion to avoid attacks to essential services. To complicate
identification of an essential service through continuous
monitoring at kernel level, our method control accesses to
process information of an essential service. In our method,
only a permitted code can access process information. If
another code accesses the process information of an essential
service, the VMM returns dummy information to the source
of access. We used a hardware-assisted paging mechanism
to control and to monitor page access, which includes the
process information of essential services. By removing read
access to the pages, all access to that page causes transition
from the VM to the VMM. Thus, we can monitor and
control the access to those pages. The proposed method
does not require modification to existing essential services.
In addition, the proposed method is applicable to various
application programs because it depends not on application
programs but on the process information managed by an
operating system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Attacks for Anti-Virus Software
Agobot [1] is malware that attacks anti-virus software.
Agobot installs backdoor to Windows hosts. The malware
seeks target processes by searching out the name from the
process list in order to disable it. An investigation on Au-
gust 8th, 2013, revealed that Agobot included 579 targeted
process names. When malware disables anti-virus software,
the risk of damage to the computer system increases.
T0rnkit [2] and dica [3] are malware for disabling a
logging program. T0rnkit is a rootkit that aims to install
a backdoor for concealing their location. Its target system
is Linux. When installing programs used by t0rnkit, the
malware stops the syslog daemon, thus hiding the installa-
tion process from a system administrator. Consequently, the
system administrator cannot detect the installation or even
the existence of other malware.
Some malware stops or disables software that prohibits
their activity on the computer. If essential services are
stopped or disabled, the risk of damage to the system
increases. For this reason, detection, prevention, and attack
avoidance for an essential service are required.
B. Existing Countermeasures
Hsu et al. proposed a protection method called ANSS
for anti-virus software from termination [5]. ANSS hooks
system calls related to process termination and control them
if they would stop anti-virus software. ANSS works as a
Windows driver that operates in kernel mode.
Virtual machine introspection [6] is the representative
approach using virtual machines. Existing approaches mon-
itors information of computers with user application pro-
grams and kernels. However, those methods are vulnerable
to kernel-level attacks. Kernel-level attacks are emerging
threats in current situation and those attacks are not negligi-
ble. However, VMI export the existing monitors to outside
a VM. Because of strong isolation of VM, the monitors are
secure than the monitor inside the kernel. Research into an
offloading host-based intrusion detection system (IDS) with
a VMM is proposed in VMwatcher [7] Implementing an IDS
by modifying a VMM makes it difficult to attack the IDS. In
the same manner, Riley et al. proposed NICKLE [8], which
prevents the execution of a kernel-level rootkit. Because it
monitors the execution of kernel code with a VMM, only
the authorized code can run. These methods help to prevent
attacks that are difficult for existing methods without a
VMM to detect and prevent.
To address these problems, we proposed a process hiding
method by replacing process information [12]. This method
replaces process information of an essential process to
dummy information to hide the essential process from at-
tackers. This method addresses the above problems because
it complicates identification of an essential process and it
is implemented by a VMM. Thus, attacks to the essential
service based on a process information becomes difficult
and the mechanism itself is secure because isolation from
attackers’ codes on a VM. In addition, the process hiding
method requires no modification to essential services.
C. Problems with Existing Methods
Existing methods cannot use essential services without
modifying them. Furthermore, these methods are effective
only when they are secure from attacks. If these methods are
themselves attacked by adversaries, a system administrator
cannot utilize those services to avoid attack. The methods
described in Section II-B are advantageous given that attacks
on a VMM are more difficult than attacks on an OS.
However, porting the functions from existing software to
a VMM is difficult and expensive. The IDS offload method
without modification is an effective approach. However, it is
difficult to apply to general application because the method
involves the emulation of each system call. To offload the
IDS completely, it is necessary to emulate all system calls.
However, complete emulation is difficult to implement.
Even though the existing VMM-based methods are iso-
lated from attackers on a VM, many of them cannot use
existing software without modification. Moreover, exporting
existing functions used by anti-virus software to a VMM
is difficult. Further, the information collected by existing
application programs (APs) and kernel is different from
the information a VMM collects. This semantic gap makes
it difficult to port functions from existing software to a
VMM. The process hiding method stated in the Section
II-B addresses these problems, however, it is vulnerable to
attacks that monitors process information of all processes
continuously. This attack can detect the essential service
when the attacker detects changes to process information.
This method does not prohibit termination of essential
processes so that the attacker can terminate them. To avoid
attacks to essential services, this problem must be addressed.
III. MEMORY ACCESS MONITORING AND DISGUISING
OF PROCESS INFORMATION
A. Basic Idea
In the proposed method, process information is defined
as information that can be used to identify a process. The
proposed method monitors accesses to and disguises the
process information depending on the source of access.
Section III-B details the disguising flow. By using this
method, only the essential service can view the original
process information, whereas other processes and untrusted
kernel modules view dummy process information.
We designed the proposed method without modifying an
essential service’s program. By utilizing a VMM, we can
design the proposed method without modifying the APs.
Because the VMM manages resources of each VM, the
VMM can monitor their memory accesses. Moreover, a
design with a VMM makes it difficult to attack the security
mechanism even if an attacker obtains kernel privilege in a
VM. Because a VMM and VM are isolated, high privilege
in a VM does not allow attacks to the proposed method in
the VMM or another VM.
The proposed method addresses the limitations of our
previous study [12] by monitoring accesses to process in-
formation. In our previous work, process information was
replaced by dummy information. However, the original
information was restored while the essential service was
running, thus allowing attackers to detect it. In contrast, the
proposed method can prevent detection by monitoring access
to the process information. Even if the process information
is restored, we can detect an access to it and handle it as
attackers cannot view the original information.
B. Monitoring Accesses to Process Information of Essential
Services
The proposed method prohibits reading access to process
information. When some programs read the process informa-
tion of an essential service on the VM, EPT violation occurs
and the VMM manages it. The VMM checks whether the
source of access is included in the permitted area; if yes, the
VMM permits read access to the accessed area and returns
to processing the VM. In other cases, the VMM saves the
original process information to another VM, replaces the
process information, and returns processing to the VM. By
replacing the process information, the source in the not-
permitted area views the dummy process information.
Table I shows who can view the process information. In
the proposed method, a kernel and permitted kernel modules
can view the original process information. However, other
kernel modules cannot view the original information. We
assume a kernel manages the process information but we do
not consider the codes in user space. To check the source of
access, we use an instruction pointer and a kernel stack. As
a kernel stack consists of return addresses, we collect them
and check whether they are in the permitted area.
We use an extended page table (EPT) to monitor accesses
to process information. Each EPT entry has a permission
vector including read, write, and execute. The proposed
method disables the read bit of an EPT entry, which com-
prises process information of an essential service. In this
situation, a read access to a page corresponding to the
EPT entry causes an EPT violation. By detecting the EPT
violation, the VMM can detect the read access to the process
information of an essential services.
C. Process Information to Monitor
The followings are the process information in Linux:





ACCESS PERMISSIONS FOR PROCESS INFORMATION OF ESSENTIAL
SERVICES
Source of Access
Permitted • Operating System Kernel
• Permitted Kernel Module
Prohibited • Prohibited Kernel Module
5) Memory used by a user process
The process control block has many resources and point-
ers related to the process including process ID, thread ID,
process name, and pointers to data structures related to files
and sockets used by the process. It is easy to identify a
process as essential by referring to its process control block.
A kernel stack has a call stack, which include information
of function call and local variables. In multi-core environ-
ment, a process running on a core can estimate an essential
process running on another core by analyzing the kernel
stack. In addition, a data structure that controls a thread is
accessible from the kernel stack because the data structure
of the kernel stack is a union of the kernel stack and thread
control data. An attacker can identify an essential process
by referring to its thread control data.
A hardware context has register values, which may uti-
lized to estimate the behavior of a process. Further, it is
possible to estimate the behavior by analyzing the memory
usage. Thus, page tables are also considered as process
information.
The memory content used by a process is unique and
contains much process-related information. Attackers are
able to identify the behavior of a process by analyzing the
memory content if they have sufficient knowledge of the
application program.
Therefore, controlling accesses to the process control
block, kernel stack, and memory content used by the process
is necessary to prevent identification of an essential process.
In this paper, we focus on the process control block. Even
if access to a kernel stack must be controlled, it can be
acquired by applying the same method used for the process
control block. However, we did not handle the memory
content used by a process because monitoring all accesses to
the memory content requires a large performance overhead.
We considered using some memory protection techniques;
however, it is outside the scope of this study.
D. Allocation of Process Information
Figure 1 shows the allocation methods of process infor-
mation. In the proposed method EPT restricts reads to the
information of essential processes. Therefore, granularity of
access control is the page size. As process control blocks
are not allocated per-page, we modified the guest OS to
allocate process control blocks per-page and the remaining
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Figure 1. Allocation of process information.
E. Overview
Figure 2 shows the overview of the proposed method. The
administrator of the Manager VM designates the essential
process. The proposed method disables read access to an
EPT entry corresponding to a page that includes information
of the essential process. Figure 2 shows the case when the
process control block of the essential process is designated
as process information. Here, only write accesses to the page
are permitted before a read access. After detecting the read
access to the page, the Control AP requests the VMM to
permit read access. When a prohibited code accesses the
process information, the Control AP replaces the process
information with a dummy information. To prevent attackers
from distinguishing the dummy information, it must be
chosen carefully. In most cases, the dummy information
should be chosen randomly with values common to many
programs. Adequate dummy information is written in our
previous study [12].
F. Consideration
1) Identification of Essential Process from File or Com-
munication Information: To identify an essential process, at-
tackers can use information related to file or communication.
For example, if an essential service accesses a specific file,
attackers can identify the essential process by monitoring
the access to the specific file.
Although that information is beneficial to attackers, the
proposed method in this paper provides measurable compli-
cation for identification. Usually, information about file or
communication is acquired through a process control block.
Because the proposed method monitors accesses to a process
control block, the VMM and the control AP can monitor
accesses to file or communication information. When the
VMM or the control AP detects accesses to them, we can
replace or disguise them as if the process is not using a
specific file or not communicating with a specific computer.
2) Management of Essential Processes on Protection Tar-
get VM: Information of an essential process is invisible to
all the other processes except itself. This indicates that the
manager of the protection target VM cannot manage the
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Figure 2. Overview of the proposed method.
essential process. We do not consider this inconvenience
a problem because we assume an essential process is a
resident service, which is not controlled by the manager
of a computer frequently. The manager of the protection
target VM can manage the essential process by requesting
the manager of the manager VM.
3) Application to Other Purposes: The proposed method
can be used for other purposes. For example, the proposed
method can be used as a countermeasure for the anti-analysis
function of malware. Some malware stops their activities
to avoid being analyzed if they find a malware analysis
environment. By applying the proposed method to a malware
analysis software may improve its success rate.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Save and restoration of process information
Figure 3 shows the flow when a code access to the prohib-
ited area. When a read access to a page that is not permitted
to read access, a VMM is called with EPT violation. In
the prototype of the proposed method, the VMM calls the
Control AP in the Manager VM. The Control AP checks
the permitted area includes the instruction pointer or not.
If the permitted area includes the instruction pointer, the
Control AP scans a kernel stack of the Protection Target VM
and collects return addresses. If the permitted area includes
the instruction pointer and all return addresses in a kernel
stack are comprised in the permitted area, the Control AP
requests the VMM to enable read access to the page. If not,
the Control AP saves the original process information and
replaces it to a dummy information. After the replacement,
the Control AP requests the VMM to enable read access to
the page and enables single step mode.
Figure 4 shows the flow when an instruction is executed
while the guest OS is in single step mode. After the VMM
is called, the VMM transfer control to the Control AP. The
control AP first disables single step mode. If the control AP
replaced the process information with a dummy information,
it restores the original process information. Finally, the
Control AP requests the VMM to disable read access to
Is the instruction pointer 
resides in the permitted 
text area?
All collected addresses 
are reside in the 
permitted text area?
Collecting return addresses from the current 
kernel stack.
Save Process Information
Activate single step mode
Detect a read of the Process Information 
on the guest OS by a VMM.





Permit read access to the Process Information
Replace the Process Information to 
dummy
Figure 3. Flow when a code access to the prohibited area.
the page to detect the next read access to the process
information.
B. Collecting Process Control Block
If the VMM detects a read access to the process infor-
mation of the essential process from the area which is not
permitted to access, it is required to collect process control
block of the kernel running on the VM from the outside.
In our method, the VMM collects the process control block
from register values of the VM. Because a process control
block and a kernel stack are linked each other, the VMM
first gets the initial address of the kernel stack. Then the
VMM gets the initial address of a process control block
from a member in the kernel stack that points the process
control block. The VMM gets the initial address of the
kernel stack by masking lower 13 bits of the stack pointer
because two pages are allocated to a kernel stack in Linux.
Because the initial address of the kernel stack is also the
initial address of thread_info, the thread_info has
a member which point task_struct (process control
block). With the above procedure, the VMM can collect and
replace process control block. Thus, the VMM must know
the definition of those data structures beforehand.
V. EVALUATION
A. Purpose and Environment
To confirm that the proposed method can replace the pro-
cess information and untrusted kernel modules cannot access
the original process information, we listed processes from
the user and kernel spaces inside the protection target VM.
Further, to estimate the performance overhead in application
programs, we measured the performance by using a micro-
benchmark program.
Deactivate Single Step Mode
Restore the Original Process Information
Detect operation on single step mode on 
the guest OS by the VMM
Return to the guest OS
Forbid read of the Process Information
Is the Process Information 
is Replaced to dummy?
Yes
No
Figure 4. Flow when an instruction is executed while the guest OS is in
single step mode.
Table II shows the environment used for evaluation. We
implemented the proposed method with the Xen hypervi-
sor [15] and Linux. We used LibVMI [13], which is a
library based on XenAccess [14], to implement the pro-
posed method. It is made for virtual machine introspection
compatible with Xen. We did not modify Xen, and wrote a
control AP on the manager VM. In the prototype, we used a
hardware-based VM (HVM) domain as the protection target
VM and dom0 as the manager VM. The computer used for
evaluation comprises Intel Core i7-2600 (3.4 GHz) and 16
GB RAM. The protection target VM has one virtual CPU
and 1 GB RAM. The manager VM comprises three virtual
CPUs and 15 GB RAM. Hyper threading and turbo boost
are disabled to suppress performance instability, and VT-x
and EPT are enabled. Linux 3.2.65 and 3.2.0 run on the
protection target and manager VMs.
B. Avoidance of Process Identification
To confirm that the proposed method can avoid attacks to
an essential process according to its name of the process,
we used malware dica, which is a rootkit for Linux and
stops a logging daemon syslogd to hide the installation
of another malware. dica uses the killall command
to terminate syslogd. killall scans the program name
of all the running processes. If a program name matches





OS Manager VM: Debian 7.3 (Linux 3.2.0 64-bit)
Protection Target VM: Debian 7.3 (Linux 3.2.65 64-bit)
Control AP LibVMI 0.10.1
Hardware
CPU Intel Core i7-2600, 3.40 GHz, 4 cores
Manager VM: 1 virtual CPU
Protection Target VM: 1 virtual CPU
Memory Manager VM: 15 GB
Protection Target VM: 1 GB
process. Because the program name is a member (comm)
of task_struct, we designated the comm member in
task_struct as process information. The experimental
results showed that if the proposed method is used, syslogd
keeps running after dica is installed to the target VM. This
is because the comm member of syslogd is replaced with a
dummy name through the proposed method and killall is
unnable to find syslogd from the process list of the VM. This
experiment confirmed that the proposed method is effective
for attacks based on process information.
C. Performance
We measured the processing time during illegal access to
process information. We compared the processing time when
the read access to the information of an essential process is
granted or prohibited. We used a kernel module on the VM
to collect a list of processes.
Figure 5 shows the measurement results when the process
information is allowed to be read, prohibited to be read,
and prohibited to be read and replaced with a dummy
information. Table III shows the mean processing time in
each case.
We measured the processing time for collecting a pro-
cess list hundred times in three cases: no restriction for
reading process information, restriction without replacement
of process information, and restriction with replacement of
process information. In the replacement case, we replaced
the name of a program of the process. The kernel module
reads a process list in a kernel from the beginning to the
end. This causes EPT violation when a program reads the
process information of an essential process. The control
AP detects the EPT violation and determines whether the
process information must be replaced. An idle process is a
user process that repeats sleep for a second.
The measurement results showed that the performance
overhead with read access restriction to process information
is 0.024 (8%) s in the init and 0.034 s (11%) in the idle.
The processing time during the replacement of process
information increases by 0.154 s (45%) in the init and
decreases by 0.003 s (1%) in the idle.
Compared to the method using replacement of process
information [12], the proposed method further will degrades
the performance. This is because the proposed method
monitors read access to the process information in addition
to replacing it. However, we believe the earlier measurement
results show that its overheads are acceptable. The workload
largely degrades the performance because it accesses process
information frequently. In contrast, common workloads do
not access process information much. Therefore, the perfor-
mance overheads in the actual workload can be expected to
be less than the aforementioned results.
D. Memory Consumption
As the proposed method requires changes to the size of

















































Figure 5. Performance of collecting a process list.
Table III














using the proposed method. The increased memory size de-
pends on the number of processes, size of the data structure
treated as process information, variant of process informa-
tion, and amount of process information. For instance, we
assume the case in which the size of the process information
(Sprocinfo) is less than a page size Spage. We designate one
process as an essential process. Then, the increased memory
size is ((Spage − Sprocinfo)× Vprocinfo)×Nproc (Nproc is
the number of processes, and Vprocinfo is the variants of
data structure).
In the evaluation environment, we used Linux 3.2.65 as
a guest OS. If we consider the process control block as
process information, the increased memory of each essential
process is 2,320 bytes because the size of task_struct
is 1,776 bytes and the page size is 4 KB. In the evaluation
environment, the increased memory is up to 209 KB because
the number of processes in the environment is 70–90.
Although the memory usage increased by 209 KB, its effect
is small because the VM has 1 GB memory.
VI. RELATED WORK
To prevent attacks to antivirus software, their vendors
implemented various software protection mechanisms [4].
Some antivirus software prevents self-termination by in-
serting kernel mode or filter drivers to prevent users or
malware from terminating antivirus services through APIs
or commands. Other protection mechanisms prevent their
executable files, libraries, and configuration files from be-
ing tampered by inserting an I/O filter driver. These self-
protection mechanisms are effective for attacks; however
advanced attacks can bypass them [4]. In addition, these
mechanisms are dependent on the structure of the an-
tivirus software. To protect antivirus software by using these
mechanisms, they must be modified and all files must be
protected from being tampered. Our proposed method can
prevent attackers from identifying antivirus software, thus
decreasing further attacks because it is difficult to determine
attack targets. By combining the proposed method and the
existing antivirus self-protection mechanism, the security of
the entire system will be enhanced.
Security monitoring studies often use virtualization tech-
nology. HyperTap [10] is a monitoring framework for relia-
bility and security of VM. HyperTap monitors events inside
a VM including context switches, system calls, and I/O
accesses. It uses events natively occurring on virtualized
environments; however, the proposed method uses additional
memory access violation to monitor accesses to specific
memory regions. As the proposed method can detect more
events than HyperTap, additional overheads are large as well.
Similar to the proposed method, Xie et al. [11] focused
on essential information managed by a kernel on a VM.
The method in [11] compares information extracted from
a VM and VMM. If the VMM detects a difference during
the comparison, it analyzes hidden information and sends an
alarm message to the end user. Compared with conventional
VMI approaches [6], [7], Xie et al. reconstructed high-level
information; including running processes, network connec-
tions, and opened files; from low-level information acquired
by the VMM. The proposed method also acquired high-
level information from low-level information. However, the
purpose of information reconstruction is different from that
in [11] because the proposed method reconstructs high-level
information and replaces it to disguise process information
from attackers.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed the design, implementation, and
evaluation of memory access monitoring and disguising
method of process information to avoid attacks to essential
services. The proposed method monitors read accesses to
the process information and disguises it when the prohibited
area includes the source of the access. Because the proposed
method disguises process information based on the source
of read access, identifying an essential service from changes
of process information becomes difficult.
Evaluations showed that the proposed method complicates
the identification of an essential process from attackers. The
modified source code of a guest OS is just one line and we
did not modify the source code of essential processes. By
using the proposed method, the measurement results showed
performance degradation of less than 45% and a memory
overhead of 209 KB when the number of processes is 90.
These evaluations show that the proposed method can avoid
attacks and its overheads are acceptable.
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